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Abstract
Social dilemmas have been widely studied to explain how hu-
mans are able to cooperate in society. Considerable effort has
been invested in designing artificial agents for social dilem-
mas that incorporate explicit agent motivations that are cho-
sen to favor coordinated or cooperative responses. The preva-
lence of this general approach points towards the importance
of achieving an understanding of both an agent’s internal de-
sign and external environment dynamics that facilitate coop-
erative behavior. In this paper, we investigate how partner
selection can promote cooperative behavior between agents
who are trained to maximize a purely selfish objective func-
tion. Our experiments reveal that agents trained with this dy-
namic learn a strategy that retaliates against defectors while
promoting cooperation with other agents resulting in a proso-
cial society.
Introduction
Human history provides many examples of people be-
having more cooperatively than is typically assumed
in behavior models featuring assumptions of rationality
and self-interest. Examples include behaving environmen-
tally responsibly (littering, recycling, etc.) (Cialdini 2003;
Thøgersen 2006) or citizens honestly paying their taxes
when there are financial incentives to do otherwise (Posner
2000). These types of situations are known as social dilem-
mas and are characterized by a trade-off between an individ-
ual’s short-term rewards and the collective long-term inter-
ests of the group, community or society as a whole (Dawes
1980). Understanding the mechanisms for the emergence of
cooperation is still an open problem in several disciplines
ranging from evolutionary biology and economics to au-
tonomous systems.
Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been ap-
plied to the study of general-sum multi-agent games like
social dilemmas (Hughes et al. 2018; Jaques et al. 2019;
Leibo et al. 2017; Perolat et al. 2017), however, it is known
that it is difficult to obtain optimal results due to the non-
stationarity caused by agents learning simultaneously (Bu-
soniu, Babuska, and De Schutter 2008). Solutions to these
problems can involve introducing techniques like modeling
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opponents or using joint-action distributions over the pop-
ulation (Lowe et al. 2017) though these techniques tend to
be affected by scalability issues. The traditional RL objec-
tive describes a selfish agent that looks to maximize its own
reward. In decentralized settings, it may not be possible to
impose any cooperative reward function on all the agents.
In these cases, it is important for the environment to be
designed in a way that allows even selfish agents to learn
behaviors which do not severely hinder other agents and,
preferably, are beneficial for the society as a whole. We ar-
gue that an answer to training RL agents in decentralized
multi-agent scenarios potentially lies in understanding the
societal dynamics that produces norm-inducing behaviors
and their effects on how and what agents learn.
We investigate a key characteristic of social interaction:
partner selection. The capability for an individual to freely
choose who they want to interact with has been thought
to have a prominent role in determining the structure of a
population and the competitive and collaborative relation-
ships that form between members of society (Santos, Santos,
and Pacheco 2008). In turn, these relationships can cause
a change in the strategies that agents learn that may go on
to impact partner selection in the future. The development
is dynamic and cyclical and has been hypothesized to be
a driving factor in the emergence of cooperative societies
and, potentially, a catalyst for altruistic behavior (Barclay
and Willer 2006; Cuesta et al. 2015).
Reputation and signaling are directly tied to the notion
of partner selection. Individuals prefer cooperative partners
and are inclined to avoid partnerships with known selfish
individuals (Albert et al. 2007; Milinski, Semmann, and
Krambeck 2002). This tendency towards preferring to inter-
act with reputable individuals suggests that the freedom to
choose may lead agents to develop strategies that maximize
the reward, while also improving reputation or signaling in
order to attract the attention of others. Signaling a desire to
coordinate or cooperate, however, may come at the cost of
becoming a target for exploitation by others. The interplay of
these dynamics has made partner selection a key component
of group formation and group inequality (Bolton and Ocken-
fels 2000; Mohtashemi and Mui 2003). Fu et al. developed a
reputation-based partner switching model that predicts a co-
operative response using agents (Fu et al. 2008) and the re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma; using result from evolutionary
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game theory they derive rules to facilitate partner switching
in order to penalize agents with a low reputation and a net-
work framework that determines the amount of information
that is available to each agent. Motivated by these findings,
we propose a model of partner selection that is character-
ized by two components: (1) N -agents are fairly presented
with only the previous interactions of their opponents and
use this information to select a partner, and then (2) each pair
of agents engages in a Dilemma game and learns from ex-
perience. Using this framework and RL agents trained with
Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan 1992), we are able to sim-
ulate the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized soci-
ety using partner selection and agents that learn according
to a selfish objective function. When we contrast our results
with the outcomes of scenarios in which agents are randomly
paired, the impact of partner selection can be clearly seen on
both the overall societal outcome and on the evolution of the
strategies that are played throughout the simulation.
We show that when selfish agents have the option to
choose a partner they are able to learn to cooperate with
“good” individuals and punish “bad” ones, a strategy of
equivalent retaliation known as Tit-for-Tat (TFT) (Axelrod
and Hamilton 1981). In our results, we can see how TFT
agents act to sustain cooperation in a society by playing a
strategy that encourages other agents to play the same strat-
egy akin to a social norm. Q-agents are capable of learn-
ing this strategy in the presence of partner selection and
maintain cooperation in the society, whereas agents trained
with random matching learn to always defect. The contri-
butions of this work are two-fold. Firstly, we demonstrate
the importance of building environments with societal dy-
namics like partner selection, such that agents can learn
norm-inducing behaviors in decentralized multi-agent set-
tings. Secondly, we provide novel insight into how cooper-
ation can emerge between selfish agents that can be con-
trasted with outcomes seen in evolutionary biology and be-
havioral economics as we use familiar framework in the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and a bottom-up approach to
partner selection that results in a well-known strategy, TFT.
For this reason, we believe that the results of this work have
implications not only for the design of cooperative artificial
agents but also for our understanding behavior in animal and
human societies.
Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas provide a powerful platform to study the
emergence of behavior and the development of coopera-
tive solutions using agents (Izquierdo, Izquierdo, and Gotts
2008; Macy and Flache 2002; Sen and Airiau 2007).
They have featured heavily in behavioral economics, psy-
chology and evolutionary biology (Axelrod and Hamilton
1981; Mohtashemi and Mui 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher
2004; Fu et al. 2008; Santos, Santos, and Pacheco 2008).
Since then, other research has looked to explain cooperative
outcomes in more complex environments termed sequential
social dilemmas and investigate innate human-inspired char-
acteristics such as a preference for fairness, pro-sociality,
or social influence while leveraging the capabilities of RL
agents to learn (Hughes et al. 2018; Jaques et al. 2019;
SD C D
C R, R S, T
D T, S P, P
rPD C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
Table 1: Payoff Matrix for Social Dilemmas and repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The motivation to defect comes from
fear of an opponent defecting or acting greedily to gain the
maximum reward when one anticipates the opponent might
cooperate. The game is modeled so that T > R > P > S
and 2R > T + S. From a game theoretic perspective, the
optimal strategy in a finite game is to defect. This is undesir-
able as the agents could both achieve greater reward if they
agreed to cooperate.
Leibo et al. 2017; Perolat et al. 2017; Peysakhovich and
Lerer 2018).
We consider a classic repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
approach, where each iteration of the game can be character-
ized by a payoff matrix. Agents play multiple rounds of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and there is continuity between games
as an agent’s previous actions are used to inform the part-
ner selection of the other agents. The resulting dilemma is
straightforward: agents must decide whether they should (1)
maximize their immediate reward by defecting while broad-
casting information to other agents that may deter them from
future interactions or (2) cooperate, forgoing the immediate
reward and risk being exploited, but potentially attract the
attention of other agents to increase future returns. For clar-
ity, we will name the outcomes in Table 1 as follows: (C,
C) is mutual cooperation, (D, C) is exploitation, (C, D) is
deception, and (D, D) is mutual defection.
Q-Learning
RL algorithms learn a policy from experience balancing ex-
ploration of the environment and exploitation.
We train our agents with Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan
1992). We train agents independently using this algorithm in
a multi-agent setting. In Q-learning, the policy of agent i is
represented through a state-action value function Qi(s, a).
The i-th agent stores a function Qi : Si × Ai → R often
parameterized by a neural network when dealing with a high
dimensional state space.
The policy of agent i is an -greedy policy and is defined
by
pii(s) =
{
argmaxa∈Ai Qi(s, a) with probability 1− 
U(Ai) with probability 
(1)
where U(Ai) denotes a sample from the uniform distribu-
tion over the action space. Each agent stores a set of trajec-
tories {(s, a, ri, s′)t : t = 1, ..., T} by interacting with the
environment and then updates its policy according to
Qi(s, a)← Qi(s, a)+α[ri+ γ max
a′∈Ai
Qi(s
′, a′)−Qi(s, a)]
(2)
where s is the current state, a is the current action, ri is the
reward obtained by agent i and s′ is the next state. As agents
are treated independently, the learning makes the environ-
ment appear non-stationary from any agent’s perspective.
Other works have attempted to address the non-stationarity
problem in multi-agent RL using a combination of joint-
action learning and importance sampling methods (Foerster
et al. 2017). However, for large populations of agents this
significantly increases the amount of required computation
and becomes infeasible for large states and action spaces.
In order to ensure that information stored in each agent’s
memory buffer is relevant to the current transition dynam-
ics of the environment, the buffers are refreshed after every
episode and the agent only trains only on the most recent
experiences.
Reinforcement Learning In Multi-Agent Social
Dilemmas
RL is a useful tool for understanding social dilemmas. In
contrast with game theoretic models, deep RL does not as-
sume knowledge of the environment dynamics and it is able
to deal with continuous state and action spaces. It can there-
fore be used with more complex environmental dynamics
that are more representative of the real-world such as inves-
tigating resource appropriation in the presence of scarce re-
sources (Perolat et al. 2017) or cooperative hunting to maxi-
mize efficiency (Leibo et al. 2017). Furthermore, it has also
been used to analyze the outcome of agents trained with
to be inequity averse with social dilemmas (Hughes et al.
2018), and of societies that feature agents with prosocial be-
havior (Peysakhovich and Lerer 2018) building on works in
behavioral economics.
The main difficulties in applying RL to multi-agent social
dilemmas are credit-assignment, non-stationarity and incen-
tive misalignment. The actual return of an agent’s action is
not contained just in the reward but is reflected in what the
other agents learn. If an agent defects, the consequences of
an action must be present in the trajectory in order for an
agent to assign an appropriate value. It is difficult to capture
this information in a trajectory without knowing when and
how other agents are learning. To help account for this, the
notion of intrinsic rewards or agent preferences is often uti-
lized during training (Eccles et al. 2019). This drives agents
to learn coordinated behavior that emphasizes cooperation.
In (Hughes et al. 2018) agents are required to balance the
external rewards they receive with their internal preference
for more equal outcomes. In (Jaques et al. 2019), the reward
that agents receive is also split into rewards that are received
from the game environment but also rewards agents for tak-
ing actions that are measured to be “highly influential” based
on the change it causes in other agents’ behaviors. Other
work has involved trying to predict changes in opponent’s
future behavior in response to current events (Foerster et al.
2018). In contrast, in this work agents do not receive any re-
wards during training other than those received directly from
playing the Dilemma.
Modeling Methodology
N agents play rounds of a Dilemma game (Table 1). In our
setup, agents are able to select a partner at the beginning of
every round to play the Dilemma and the goal of the game
is to achieve the highest possible individual reward after T
rounds. This also means that each agent takes at least T ac-
tions. The best collective outcome for society is for all the
agents to cooperate unconditionally as this would guaran-
tee maximum reward for every interaction. However, such
an outcome is unlikely because the immediate rewards as-
sociated with defecting in a highly cooperative society are
also significantly higher. By introducing partner selection,
agents have to balance the rewards of greedy defecting be-
havior with the future cost of being excluded.
An episode of the game is split into two phases: in the
first phase, each agent has a chance to select another agent
to play the Dilemma. During this phase, actions as ∈ Rn−1
involve selecting one of the other n − 1 agents in the envi-
ronment. Agents cannot select themselves and, if selected,
they cannot refuse to play. There are no other restrictions on
which agents can be selected nor how many times any agent
can be selected. In the second phase, the selecting agent, i,
and chosen agent, j, play one round of the Dilemma, taking
actions (aid, a
j
d) where ad ∈ [C,D] and receive reward rd.
Actions and rewards are according to the payoff in Table 1.
Agents receive no reward from selecting a partner and only
receive rewards when playing the Dilemma. Their rewards
from playing must therefore inform their selection.
During selection, every agents’ most recent h actions are
visible to all other agents. Each action is represented as a
one-hot encoding and concatenated together such that for
the playing phase agents see states sd ∈ R2×h and in the
selection phase ss ∈ R2×h×(n−1). We choose to set h = 1
for interpretability. This limits the number of strategies that
can be learned to just four strategies that are recognized in
other literature (see Results).
In order to assess the emergent behavior associated with
the dynamics of partner selection, it is important to be able
to vary characteristics like the number of parameters and the
agents’ exploration rates for playing the Dilemma and se-
lection. To give us this flexibility, each agent consists of two
models: the selection model learns a policy pis to take action
as given ss while the dilemma model learns a policy pid to
take action ad given sd. During each episode, a trajectory
τ = {ss, as, rs, sd, ad, rd, ...} was sampled from pis and pid
and then each model was trained on the states and actions
sampled from their respective policies.
We parameterize each model using a neural network with
one hidden layer. We test various network sizes between 32
and 256. We display the results for the case of a network
size equal to 256 which were the most consistent and infor-
mative for understanding the development of strategy. Each
agent employs an -greedy policy with a fixed d = 0.05
when playing the Dilemma and s = 0.1 when selecting a
partner. A discussion on  is present in the Results section.
Both models use the standard a discount rate γ = 0.99.
Results and Discussion
In this section, we present results that indicate there is a sig-
nificant impact on the development and emergence of co-
operation as a result of partner selection. Alongside partner
(a) Matching determined by partner selection (b) Random matching
Figure 1: The mean and standard deviation of the number of times an outcome occurs between two agents as a percentage over
14 runs of the simulation. In our simulation, the dynamic of partner selection is essential for cooperation to emerge as a viable
action which leads to a significantly higher global reward. With partner selection we observe distinct phases where certain
strategies dominate. The start of each phase is marked with a dashed line. Eventually agents learn to predominantly cooperate
after approximately 15,000 episodes. When pairing is random, agents quickly learn to defect and do not learn any cooperative
strategy throughout the simulation.
selection, we look at the roles of exploration and the types
of learned strategies that promote a cooperative outcome.
Emergence of Cooperation through Partner
Selection
Training Q-agents in the two-player repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma without partner selection results in both agents
learning to defect every time. With random selection in a
multi-agent population, agents converge to the same solu-
tion that is seen in the two-player case shown in Fig 1(b).
When agents are given the ability to choose a partner within
a population cooperation begins to emerge and the returns
for the society steadily improve.
We observe four distinct phases characterized by different
strategies of the agents. In particular, we identify four phases
which we mark in Fig 1(a). We plot the number of agents
that have selected a partner who has previously cooperated
versus a partner who has previously defected in Fig 3. In line
with our expectations, at convergence, the partner of choice
is a partner that has previously cooperated. Each of these
four phases also coincides with a development in the strategy
of the agents in the society which are as follows:
• Phase 1: Agents learn to defect without partner selection
(Rise in mutual defection).
• Phase 2: Agents learn to pick a partner who has demon-
strated cooperative behavior and defect against them (Rise
in exploitation). Agents pick a partner who has demon-
strated cooperative behavior and cooperates with them
(Rise in mutual cooperation).
• Phase 3: Agents learn to retaliate (defect) against exploita-
tive partners (Fall in exploitation). Agents learn to coop-
erate when selected by other cooperative agents (Rise in
mutual cooperation).
• Phase 4: We observe the emergence of a stable coopera-
tive society with the majority of agents adopting a behav-
ior that resembles equivalent retaliation, i.e., adoption of
the Tit-for-Tat strategy.
When limiting the information an agent has of its oppo-
nent to just the action taken at the previous timestep we limit
the space of strategies agents can learn to four strategies: (1)
where agents always cooperate (ALL C), (2) where agents
always defect (ALL D), (3) Tit-for-Tat (TFT) where agents
copy the last action of their opponent, and (4) reverse Tit-for-
Tat (revTFT), where agents play the opposite of their oppo-
nent’s last action. To best understand the development of the
agent strategies throughout the simulation, we capture both
the outcomes of the agent encounters at every episode (Fig
1), the improvement in selection accuracy in (Fig 3), and a
box-plot of the strategies being used (4).
In the first phase, all agents quickly learn a defecting pol-
icy that causes a decrease in the society’s cumulative reward.
We can explain this outcome by observing that the agents
have not yet learned how to select a partner efficiently. If the
partner selection is uninformed, then each interaction can be
treated independently and thus there are no future rewards
associated with cooperating. Consequently, defecting is the
preferred strategy for almost all agents. The partner selec-
tion accuracy of agents steadily improves, which facilitates
the transition to the second phase.
The second phase begins at approximately 2,500 episodes
into the simulation and is characterized by an increase in ex-
ploitation and a steep decrease in mutual defection. Agents
have improved their capability to select cooperative part-
ners, which increases the rewards associated with defecting.
Although the outcome of the society is significantly differ-
ent as a result of partner selection, the strategies used in the
Dilemma are the same: agents primarily defect. What facil-
itates the transition to the next stage is the following: (1)
agents who cooperate are selected to play more frequently
than defecting agents (and, therefore, are given the oppor-
tunity to potentially receive rewards); and (2) with enough
(a) epsilon=0.1 (b) epsilon=0.01
Figure 2: Higher exploration results in the society going through the different phases quicker but agents demonstrate less overall
cooperation. Lower exploration inhibits the transition to a cooperative phase.
Figure 3: Percentage of agents selected who have cooperated
in their last interaction.
exploration, cooperation can be sufficiently rewarded and
agents can start to learn to punish agents who would try to
exploit them.
This happens at approximately 5,000 episodes where
there is a steep decline in exploitation. This leads to the
third phase where there is a sufficient amount of cooperators
such that they can be easily selected and exploiters begin to
be punished. In episode 7,500 there is a steady increase in
the number of encounters resulting in mutual cooperation.
Tracking the agent strategies (Fig 4) reveals that this can be
attributed to the rise in TFT. With an increase in the num-
ber of TFT agents, defecting agents exploit others less suc-
cessfully as an agent who has previously cooperated is more
likely to be a TFT agent than an ALL C agent resulting in en-
counters leading to mutual defection. At the 10,000 episode
mark, mutual cooperation overtakes exploitation as the most
common outcome of two agents interacting that is observed
in the society. Looking at Fig 3, this also coincides with the
convergence of partner selection as 90% of agents who are
selected to play the Dilemma have cooperated in their last in-
teraction. After 15,000 training episodes, the society enters
a phase of where a significant majority of interactions result
in mutual cooperation and the society has mostly stabilized.
This is also where the society achieves its highest cumulative
reward. It is expected that at this point, where the number of
TFT agents is at its highest, is where the number of ALL D
agents is at its lowest. The number of ALL C agents stays
relatively consistent from phase 2 throughout to phase 4, al-
though it increases when the ALL D strategy is no longer
popular.
The impact of TFT agents here can be clearly seen as they
significantly limit the effectiveness of the defecting strategy.
As long as agents use ALL D, the best response strategy is
to employ TFT. Furthermore, when more agents use TFT,
the more rewards TFT agents will receive during an episode
which further pushes agents to employ it as a strategy. We
can see that once agents are able to select cooperative part-
ners, the TFT strategy acts as a norm by inducing other
agents to play the same strategy which produces the most
stable iteration of the society.
Analyzing Examples From Simulation
Tracking the returns of each agent alone is insufficient to
capture the state of the society and the group’s behavior.
For a more granular understanding, we further plot exam-
ples from the phases from a simulation to show the number
of times each agent is selected and the strategies they use
(Fig 5), the individual reward they receive (Fig 6), and the
interactions represented as a network (Fig 7). We specifi-
cally consider examples of interactions between the phase
transitions described in the previous section.
In episode 2,500, rewards are evenly spread across agents,
however, selections are heavily skewed in favor of coop-
erative agents. Nevertheless, they receive very similar re-
wards to other agents using TFT or ALL D strategies. ALL
D agents that are picked more often do not receive signif-
icantly more rewards as they are most often being selected
by agents who are also defecting meaning little reward is
gained from those encounters. In episode 7,500, we observe
more agents using a TFT strategy. However, the two most
successful strategies in this phase are ALL D (agent 16) and
ALL C (agent 7) both of whom benefit from more effective
Figure 4: Box plots representing the number of agents that use each strategy during phase transitions. The rise in ALL C and
TFT agents coincides with an improvement in partner selection. Once partner selection converges, the number of TFT agents
rapidly increases which results in a more stable, cooperative society.
partner selection.
In phase 3, surprisingly, we observe the largest amount
of inequality. Due to the growing number of TFT agents,
agents using ALL C strategy receive significantly more re-
ward while agents that use ALL D and receive the smaller
rewards on average. The amount of reward the defecting
agents receive is lower due to a combination of not being
selected by other agents, the number of TFT agents in the
population (making it difficult for them to find cooperative
agents to exploit), as well as cooperative agents being able
to reliably cooperate with one another. With only a single
available history, the ALL D agents cannot distinguish be-
tween an ALL C agent and a TFT agent that has recently co-
operated. Interestingly, when a TFT agent punishes an ALL
D agent (or faces a TFT or ALL C agent who has recently
explored defection), the TFT agent suffers a cost in the next
round as their chance of getting selected is reduced despite
having behaved in a cooperative way by punishing a defec-
tor. This explains why ALL C receives the highest overall
reward. As ALL C always cooperates, it does not face this
penalty but still benefits from the regulatory behavior pro-
vided by other TFT agents. Nevertheless, we can see that
the strategy that is adopted by most agents is surprisingly
not the strategy that necessarily generates the highest reward
in each episode.
The Role Of Exploration
In RL, it is necessary to give agents the opportunity to ex-
plore the environment to find an optimal strategy. In multi-
agent systems when the agents are continuously developing
new strategies, there is a need to explore constantly in or-
der to react to the shift in environment dynamics. However,
agents exploring can impact the learning of other agents. Too
much exploration at the wrong time can inhibit the conver-
gence to certain behaviors. As an example, if a single agent
has a cooperative strategy when all the other agents have a
defecting strategy, then exploration benefits the cooperative
strategy. On the other hand, when all agents behave cooper-
atively, exploration instead becomes costly for cooperators.
In our work we have suggested that, in order to achieve a co-
operative outcome, the agent strategy undergoes four stages.
We can see that increasing the base exploration rate affects
the rate at which these strategies are learned, however, it also
significantly affects the overall society’s return. In Fig 2(a)
a higher exploration rate results in an overall less coopera-
tive outcome and, therefore, less cumulative reward. Simi-
larly, in Fig 2(b), if the exploration rate is too low, it makes
it difficult for agents to adjust their strategies and, despite
doubling the number of episodes, the agents are not able to
reach a cooperative solution.
Although more exploration facilitates a quicker transition
between phases, it also jeopardizes the stability and gains of
the final outcome. We should therefore be mindful in how we
determine the exploration strategy that our agents employ in
the presence of other learners.
Inclusion and Exclusion to Promote
Norm-Inducing Behavior
The impact of partner selection happens in two steps that
can be viewed as inclusive acts and exclusive acts. Firstly,
agents need to be able to distinguish between different types
of agents. Cooperators need to be included to allow cooper-
ation to compete with defecting strategies for reward. Sec-
ondly, agents need to be able to learn or adapt their playing
strategy given a selection strategy that leads to the exclusion
of and retaliation against defectors. We view this behavior as
norm-inducing as it forces agents to conform to an existing
strategy that has been adopted by the majority of the agents.
In order for the norm to persist, the TFT agents need to inter-
act with a mix of both ALL C and ALL D agents and, while
it regulates the behavior of the other agents, the emergence
and presence of TFT behavior itself is not sustained by it.
Although agents that use an ALL C strategy tend to receive
the highest rewards, without other agents employing a TFT
strategy, the stability of a cooperative society is threatened.
Our experiments suggest that the emergence of cooperation
is contingent on having a sufficient number of agents learn-
ing to exclude bad behavior even if they share some of the
associated cost.
In Fig 7, we display centrality plots from network analy-
sis to visualize partner selection with nodes positioned ac-
cording to Fruchterman-Reingold force-directed algorithm
(Fruchterman and Reingold 1991). In these plots, two nodes
are close if there are more interactions between them. As
partner selection becomes more effective in terms of reward
with more training episodes, the network gets tighter with
Figure 5: With every agent searching for a partner that indicates that they will cooperate, the agent that is most commonly
selected are ones that use ALL C. Early on in the training, ALL D is quickly adopted by most agents while reverse TFT is
phased out. As agents learn TFT, the distribution of selections flattens. As more agents play TFT, less agents play ALL D.
Figure 6: In the early stages of the simulation and very few cooperative agents, the spread of rewards per episode is fairly even.
Despite being selected the vast majority of the time, ALL C agents receive similar rewards per episode. As other agents learn
TFT, the amount of reward that ALL C agents receive significantly increases, while it decreases for ALL D agents. Eventually,
when the majority of agents play TFT, the average rewards per agent increases.
Figure 7: Degree centrality plots of 20 agents in a society during training. Each node represents an agent, while each directed
edge represents an interaction between two agents. Agents with more interactions between each other have shorter edges. Axes
simply represent a normalized node position centered on the origin.
ALL C nodes having a higher degree centrality and influ-
ence. In the examples above, ALL D agents are prominent
outside the core of the network while agents who cooper-
ate have higher degree centrality. As training progresses,
the connections are distributed more evenly as more agents
adopt equivalent-retaliation (TFT) strategy and become vi-
able partners for cooperation. With more TFT agents, it is
harder for ALL D agents to find ALL C agents to exploit
which decreases the amount of connections between those
two node types. This causes a change in the network struc-
ture where there is less likely to be just one or two highly
influential nodes. Finally, as mutual cooperation overtakes
exploitation and the society stabilizes, the network connec-
tions become more evenly spread with nodes having similar
degree centrality.
Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of the effect of partner se-
lection on the emergence of cooperation. We have shown
that agents can learn to cooperate in the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma using multi-agent reinforcement learning. We have
outlined four key phases that begin with defection but, as
partner selection improves, the agents achieve a cooperative
outcome. Although subject to certain environment variables,
such as reward and the amount of information available to
each agent, partner selection allows for a cooperative strat-
egy to be sustained early on in the simulation when the ma-
jority of agents defect. This facilitates a development of a
strategy that learns to interact efficiently with both coop-
erative and defective agents akin to Tit-for-Tat. The stabil-
ity of a cooperative outcome is dependent on how success-
fully agents are able to use information about another agent’s
history to inform partner selection and their strategy in the
Dilemma. Although TFT agents tend to receive less reward
than fully cooperative agents at certain stages, the presence
of this strategy is required for cooperation to emerge at all
as it regulates the exploitative behavior of defecting agents.
The results of this work demonstrate the importance of un-
derstanding how agents can learn to interact with each other
in an environment beyond internal agent or reward function
design that can help produce optimal cooperative outcomes
and provides insight into the emergence of cooperation in
social dilemmas.
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